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Cormac Mac Amhlaigh’s stimulating article challenges the coherence of 
political constitutionalism.1 He makes four main critical claims. First, that 
political constitutionalists contend disagreement goes ‘all the way down’; 
second, that given they maintain this disagreement applies to processes as 
much as outcomes, there is no impartial, Archimedean point, from which 
to assess the rival claims of different procedures, and hence no way they 
can argue for the superiority of political over legal constitutionalism; 
third, that contrary to their assertion that process matters more than 
outcomes, the normative legitimacy of any process must rest on an 
outcome assessment of its preserving certain minimal standards, such as 
upholding basic rights; and fourth, that they can only defend a preference 
for political over legal constitutionalism where it is already in place and 
meets these minimal legitimacy requirements. All four of these criticisms 
have figured in different forms in the literature on political 
constitutionalism, but Mac Amhlaigh has undoubtedly advanced the 
argument by both offering a clear statement of each of them and showing 
how they are linked.  
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Needless to say I disagree - not unreasonably I hope - with the 
validity of all four, at least in regard to my own characterization of 
political constitutionalism (although much of what I say in my own 
defence may well apply to Jeremy Waldron’s views as well, the other 
main target of Mac Amhlaigh’s critique).2  I believe that Mac Amhlaigh 
mischaracterizes what I shall call ‘the circumstances of disagreement’ 
and in doing so adopts a position that is itself self-defeating. At the heart 
of our disagreement lie two different conceptions of constitutionalism 
that only partially overlap with the distinction between legal and political 
constitutionalism. The first conception can be characterised as a form of 
what Bernard Williams termed political moralism.3 It conceives a 
constitution as a moral structure that provides foundations for and 
constraints upon the political and, in some versions, also goals for politics 
to enact. The second conception aligns itself more with what Williams 
called political realism.4 It gives greater autonomy to political concerns 
related to the need for an authoritative process of decision-making that 
are distinct from morality. Both conceptions could be institutionalised in 
ways that involved either judicial or legislative supremacy. For example, 
democratic institutions could be so designed that they promote a given 
conception of justice,5 as a political moralist would advocate, or Courts 
                                           
2 The main targets of his argument are R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) (hereafter PC) and J. Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement, (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
3 B. Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’, in In the Beginning Was 
the Deed (Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-2 
4 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’, 3 
5 e.g. P. Van Parijis, Just Democracy: The Rawls-Machiavelli Programme, (ECPR 
Press, 2011). 
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be viewed simply as a necessary political mechanism to provide 
authoritative decisions,6 as a political realist would argue.  
What gives my account of political constitutionalism its 
distinctively political cast is its political realist starting point rather than 
the advocacy of legislative supremacy per se. It is this political realist 
character that leads to the emphasis on constitutional process rather than 
the achievement of certain constitutional outcomes, such as political 
moralists would advocate. As I suggest below, this process-based view 
does ultimately favour legislative over judicial supremacy. However, 
even if it provides no clear knock-down argument for the former, it 
certainly alters how we should conceive of the latter.  
In what follows, I draw on Williams to suggest why all four of Mac 
Amhlaigh’s charges misfire through invoking a political moralist as 
opposed to a political realist conception of constitutionalism. As a result, 
he is led to making a second order critique of the grounding of any first 
order constitutional reasoning, the necessity for and plausibility of which 
I largely deny. It is for that reason that he fears an infinite regress in the 
face of ubiquitous disagreement, whereas I am content to regard it as a 
permanent and unavoidable feature of the human condition and simply to 
start from where we are. 
 
1. All the Way Down? The ‘Circumstances of Disagreement’  
Though Mac Amhlaigh puts the phrase ‘disagreement all the way down’ 
in quotation marks, it is not one I ever employ in the book, though 
                                           
6 E.g. Martin Schapiro’s characterization of the ECJ in M. Shapiro, ‘The European 
Court of Justice’, in P. Craig and G. de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 321–7. 
 4 
Waldron does.7 Of course, even without using the phrase my argument 
that ‘politics goes all the way down’ and defence of ‘the basic normative 
case for a thorough-going proceduralism that goes all the way down’ 
might be thought to entail such a position,8 whether I realised it or not. 
However, I believe that overstates my argument and is neither necessary 
to, nor supportive of, my case for political constitutionalism. Indeed, to 
the extent Mac Amhlaigh appears to embrace this position himself, at 
least for the purposes of this article, I shall argue it undermines the 
alternative case he wishes to make. 
 The belief that disagreement goes ‘all the way down’ might be 
taken as a form of what Ronald Dworkin called ‘external’ scepticism.9 
Such a position would be sceptical about the whole enterprise of legal 
and political argument. It would maintain that the fact we disagree 
suggests that no moral and political view could ever be right. Yet that 
goes too far, as it would negate the very holding of a substantive position 
in the first place. Such ‘external’ scepticism can be deemed ontological. 
By contrast, what Dworkin called ‘internal’ scepticism reflects the 
experience of anyone who takes moral and political argument and their 
own positions within it seriously. It is the acknowledgement that the 
presence of other views to one’s own, including views that involve 
criticisms of one’s views, mean that one may be wrong. Such ‘internal’ 
scepticism can be regarded as epistemological – it reflects the limitations 
of our practical reasoning which make us prone to error. 
Hypothetically, an objective and just resolution of people’s 
disagreements may exist – not necessarily sub specie aeternitatis, a 
                                           
7 Just the once, so far as I can tell, at Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 295, where he 
states ‘It looks as though it is disagreement all the way down, so far as constitutional 
choice is concerned.’ 
8 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism, 152, 174. 
9 R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 25.2 (1996), 88. 
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notion I criticise below, but of a kind that makes sense to people in a 
given historically contingent situation. That supposition provides us with 
something to disagree about, rather than disagreeing for disagreement’s 
sake. After all, both political and legal constitutionalists agree that 
protecting certain rights and guarding against particular ways of 
exercising power are important. However, they disagree about why, how, 
when and by whom – even among themselves. Practically, nobody has 
access to an objective perspective from which to resolve these disputes. 
Stupidity, ignorance or self-interest no doubt all play a part in creating 
much disagreement. Yet, disagreement also arises among the wise and 
well-intentioned because our individual perspectives on what ought to be 
done are inevitably partial in the sense of being both incomplete and 
reflecting a personal bias.10 Lacking omniscience, our knowledge of 
others and of the causes or effects of any action or policy will always be 
flawed, making our reasoning fallible and opening up the prospect that 
with the best will in the world we are prone to errors that may have 
profoundly damaging consequences. Similarly, our values and judgments 
tend to reflect our own experience and knowledge – however hard we try, 
it proves highly improbable that we could entirely satisfactorily place 
ourselves fully in the shoes of those whose ways of thinking and social 
context may be either metaphorically or literally outside our ken. These 
two forms of partiality together comprise the ‘circumstances of 
disagreement’. 
These ‘circumstances of disagreement’ have political and legal 
importance because of what Rawls, following Hume, termed the 
‘circumstances of justice’.11 Scarce resources and limited altruism mean 
that no one can assume that they will either have enough to satisfy all 
                                           
10 T. Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, (Oxford University Press, 2008) 88-96. 
11 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 1971) 126-30 
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they need for their projects, or can count on the spontaneous forbearance 
or support of others when necessary. As a result, conflicts will arise, 
leading to the need for collective rules assigning who is entitled to or 
owed what by whom, when and how. Yet, we must collectively agree on 
these necessary collective rules in the light of extensive disagreement 
about their substance, sources, subjects, sphere and scope. Such 
disagreements about the nature and application of rights and justice, 
combined with the need for collective agreements about them, together 
comprise what Waldron has called ‘the circumstances of politics’.12  
The circumstances of politics make necessary the establishment of 
some form of political authority capable of determining our rights despite 
our disagreements. Bernard Williams regarded this necessity for the 
authoritative ‘securing of order, protection, trust and the conditions of co-
operation’ as ‘the first political question’ because ‘it is the condition of 
solving, indeed posing, any others’.13 In that sense, politics goes ‘all the 
way down’, as I noted I did say, because it is fundamental.  Yet, how are 
we to ensure such an authority is also constitutional? Clearly, it will be 
constitutive of the political community, but how could we agree on its 
meeting constitutional norms despite our disagreements about those 
norms? This is the question to which political constitutionalism attempts 
to provide an answer, with Mac Amhlaigh contending that response to be 
inadequate. 
 If the circumstances of disagreement were ontological, then any 
attempt to take constitutional norms such as rights seriously would be 
futile. This scenario belongs to what H. L. A. Hart famously termed the 
                                           
12 Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 107-13. 
13 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’, 3 
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Nightmare of certain schools of American jurisprudence.14 It appears to 
assume that without unambiguous second order grounds for the truth and 
objectivity of our first order arguments; any view we express or 
agreement we reach will be arbitrary. Political constitutionalists have no 
need to adopt this position. They can sensibly engage in first order 
arguments about their situation in terms that make sense to us in the here 
and now without answering or even asking second order questions 
concerning the cosmic validity of these terms.15 This is what most people 
do most of the time about most of the things that matter to them. Yet, 
what Hart characterized as the Noble Dream of appealing directly to a 
correct understanding of certain rights and other constitutional norms  - 
even of a basic ‘minimal’ kind, such as Mac Amhlaigh proposes - will 
not work either. Disagreement at the epistemological level means that the 
basis for such an appeal does not exist. Rather, rights and other 
constitutional norms can only be taken seriously in the manner whereby 
the necessary decisions about them are argued for and made. These 
decisions are not only political in purpose, as we saw, but also need to be 
regarded as being decided politically. Such political decision-making 
must aim at legitimacy, which I define below in section 3, without being 
able to show that the decision reached is the most just or the best – 
indeed, it must do so because it cannot show that to be the case. 
Consequently, all that can be shown is that the process of decision-
making has treated the norms at issue as important and that people’s 
different views about them have been respected and debated.  
Herein lies the normative case for my advocacy of ‘a thorough-
going proceduralism that goes all the way down’. Namely, that there is no 
                                           
14 H L A Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream’, Ga. L. Review 968 (1977) 
15 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, p. 11. 
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other way to take constitutional norms seriously than through the way our 
arguments and decisions about them proceed. We cannot avoid starting 
with procedures. Yet, it can be noted, that is no different to many other 
areas of human enquiry. For example, acceptance of the findings of 
natural science turn likewise on the methods employed to validate them, 
which are similarly subject to continuous refinement. Different types of 
process are appropriate to different fields of enquiry. The claim made 
here is that the process for deciding constitutional issues cannot but be 
political in the broad sense of providing a politically necessary resolution 
of disputes between political opponents about the values to be realised in 
their collective life.  
 The priority of politics and the inescapability of procedures of a 
broadly political kind provide two key features of a politically realist 
constitutionalism. Together they motivate the move away from the focus 
on a legal document as a statement of moral principles as the hallmark of 
constitutionalism and towards a concentration on the manner in which 
constitutional norms are politically debated, decided and determined – 
both in general and in particular cases. Nevertheless, not enough has been 
said at this stage to definitely tip the scales towards political rather than 
legal processes of debate. These criteria might be satisfied by a broadly 
political account of legal constitutionalism – one, say, that characterised 
the moral reading of the constitution not as the enactment of the Noble 
Dream, as Hart assumed Dworkin conceived it,16 but, as was arguably 
nearer Dworkin’s position, as a political debate in legal terms about the 
moral principles a democratic society should uphold.17 Yet, if we disagree 
                                           
16 Dworkin denied he held this ‘silly’ view in Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd impression, 
(Duckworth, 1978), p. 293. 
17 As Jeremy Waldron has noted, Dworkin famously rejected the notion of any 
Archimedean point, remarking that the notion that there was a ‘right answer’ ‘locked 
up in some transcendental strongbox’ was ‘nonsense’ (Taking Rights Seriously, p. 
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as much about procedures as we do about outcomes, how can we decide 
between different kinds of political and legal processes? It might seem we 
can only escape the frying pan of ontological scepticism by entering the 
fire of an epistemological scepticism that involves an infinite regress 
regarding process. 
 
2. No Archimedean Point: Procedures and the Problem of Infinite 
Regress 
As Mac Amhlaigh observes, political constitutionalists may embrace a 
proceduralist view of constitutionalism but they do not thereby adopt the 
view of someone such as John Hart Ely, who believed that judicial review 
of the process of democratic decision-making is acceptable in ways that 
the review of the substantive decisions of democratic bodies is not.18 
Political constitutionalists argue that procedures are as controversial as 
the decisions made by them – indeed, the two are intrinsically linked 
given that the validation of any decision comes through the way it is 
made. Yet, for that self-same reason, they can resist the futile attempt to 
find a perfect procedure from which we can assess the best procedure for 
given situations and purposes. On this account, there is simply no 
Archimedean point and so no need for an infinite regress towards some 
                                                                                                                        
216). On his account, we can only have arguments about right answers, and these 
must always be open to counter-arguments. His support for legal over political 
constitutionalism largely stems from the alleged superiority of legal argumentation – a 
process view in other words - which, as Waldron remarks, depended on a contestable 
understanding of political processes.  See J. Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law as a Theatre 
of Debate’, in J. Burley (ed), Dworkin and his Critics, (Blackwell, 2004) at 326-7. 
Nevertheless, as Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 12, discerned, Dworkin’s 
account of law trades on the possibility of political moralism. A more truly political 
realist account of courts as a model of public adversarial deliberation can be found in 
S. Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, (Princeton, 2000), especially 89-90, where he 
discusses the US Supreme Court. 
18  J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, (Harvard 
University Press, 1981). See the critique of his position in PC 107-118. 
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originating procedure that might provide such a point.19 We can only start 
from the procedures we have and seek to improve them through voicing 
our disagreements within them and thereby motivating changes to them. 
Moreover, we do not need to engage in a second order reflection on the 
best possible procedure to offer sensible first order reflections on the 
adequacy of current procedures for our present needs. 
  This reasoning underlies my scepticism regarding the supposed 
special merits of constitutional conventions as mechanisms for 
legitimizing subsequently entrenched constitutions. Such proposals 
suppose these conventions might offer such an Archimedean point by 
representing an especially elevated and serious political process that 
would be superior to all subsequent processes. However, the evidence for 
a sharp distinction between constitutional and normal politics seems thin 
and hard to justify if all processes are potentially challengeable. Rather, 
there is a need for the processes that establish and adjudicate on 
constitutional questions to be permanently open to criticism and change.20 
 Mac Amhlaigh and others have raised a number of potential 
problems with this process of continually re-building the constitutional 
ship at sea. First, objectors worry that it might undermine the authority of 
the prevailing process if it and the decisions it has made become liable to 
continuous challenge. The capacity of a political authority to settle issues 
will be weakened, damaging its capacity to respond to Williams’ first 
political question. However, this worry seems exaggerated given these 
same objectors generally accept that Constitutional Courts can and do 
overrule their precedents and revise their competences without a descent 
                                           
19 See PC 173-4 
20 See Richard Bellamy and Justus Schönlau, ‘The Normality of Constitutional 
Politics: An Analysis of the Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 
Constellations11.3 (2004) 412-33 
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into anarchy. After all, many important and wide-ranging reforms to our 
democratic processes, such as woman’s suffrage, have come about 
without wholesale revolution. Even when these reforms involved and 
were precipitated by protests outside the established processes, such as 
acts of civil disobedience, they invariably ended up being formally 
enacted and legitimated within them. In part, that was because even such 
radical reforms could be put forward not so much as wholesale rejections 
of these processes as better understandings of the practical requirements 
demanded by their inner rationale.  
 Mac Amhlaigh’s second objection, that using a process, such as 
majority rule, to decide on the suitability of that same process is likewise 
illogical and illegitimate, fails for similar reasons.  How, he argues, can a 
system of majority rule, say, be used to determine whether to constrain or 
extend majority rule or not?21 Again, this argument seems to depend for 
its coherence on the belief that some perfect procedure might exist that 
could determine all other procedures, thereby triggering the very infinite 
regress that these critics accuse political constitutionalists of being 
committed to. Yet this dilemma only exists for those who believe such an 
Archimedean point might exist. Without that possibility, the criticism 
misfires – there simply is no alternative than to grasp the procedural 
nettle as we find it. Not all decision procedures are inherently biased in 
their operation to the status quo  - a system of making decisions on the 
toss of a coin, for example, offers an equal chance to any alternative to 
continuing the practice. Majority rule in and of itself has no inherent bias 
to majority rule. Rather, for well-known reasons,22 it is neutral between 
the options it is used to decide between, gives all involved an equal say, 
                                           
21 This seems to be a version of the nemo iudex in sua causa argument, though he does not 
mention it by name. I examine this objection more generally in PC 118-20. 
22 K. May, ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple 
Majority Decision’, 20, ECONOMETRICA  680 (1952), 680. 
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and responds positively to what people choose. Consequently, it is 
unsurprising that majority systems in Canada, New Zealand and the UK 
have introduced both Bills of Rights and, in some instances, PR, 
admittedly in certain cases by allowing for an alternative to the ordinary 
legislative process to decide the issue, albeit usually one, such as a 
referendum, involving a form of majority rule, though a form different to 
that prevailing in making normal legislation. Yet, that decision itself was 
made and implemented by majority rule within the legislature. Moreover, 
these critics of majority rule within legislatures have little if anything to 
say about its similar use by judges in multimember courts to resolve their 
disputes. 
I have still said nothing that need decisively favour legislative over 
judicial supremacy. True, a defence of judicial supremacy in purely 
‘output’ terms is ruled out by the argument that the credibility and 
appropriateness of any outcome always turns on the character of the 
process employed to support it. However, legal constitutionalists can and 
do make just such a case in noting qualities of the legal process, such as 
its purported impartiality and even-handedness, which supposedly render 
it superior in these respects to political processes as a forum of 
constitutional principle.23 By the same token, though, nothing here rules 
out the possibility for political constitutionalists to challenge a prevailing 
legal constitutionalist system either, as Mac Amhlaigh proposes must be 
the case. I return to that argument in section 4. Before doing so, I want to 
explore Mac Amhlaigh’s third claim that the political constitutionalist 
position implies that there are no criteria of legitimacy that could allow a 
criticism of any process, even that of a totalitarian regime. According to 
this objection, constitutionalism in and of itself must assume some 
                                           
23 Most famously, R. Dworkin, ‘The Forum of Principle’, in A Matter of Principle, 
(Harvard University Press, 1985) 33-71, but see too Hampshire, Justice is Conflict. 
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criteria that stand outside any process  - a role he ascribes to a minimum 
theory of legitimacy. 
 
3. Political not Metaphysical: The Basic Legitimation Demand 
In addressing this point it is helpful to return to Williams’ account of the 
political. He argued that it was not enough for a political system to 
answer the ‘first political question’; it must also meet the ‘Basic 
Legitimation Demand’ (BLD).24 To do so, the response to the first 
political question must offer ‘an “acceptable” solution’, one that can 
provide a justification of the political system’s right to rule to each person 
subject to it. While he distinguished the two analytically, noting that an 
answer to the first political question provides a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for meeting the BLD, he saw the two as 
interconnected since the first political question could not be answered 
adequately without meeting the BLD. As he elaborated it, ‘acceptable to 
each’ turns out to be a threshold condition – that there should be no group 
‘so radically disadvantaged’ by the prevailing regime that they conceive 
themselves as enemies of the polity and its rulers.25  
Mapping Williams’ account onto both Mac Amhlaigh’s argument 
and the discussion of the circumstances of politics above, we can see the 
first political question as responding to the need for an authority capable 
of providing a stable set of rules of justice capable of coordinating the 
social activities of the members of a political community. Yet, if 
disagreement goes all the way down, then the criteria of legitimacy 
needed to decide if the BLD has also been met will themselves be subject 
to the disagreements that give rise to the need for such a political 
authority in the first place. As a result, Williams, seems open to a parallel 
                                           
24 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 4. 
25 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 5. 
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criticism to that levelled by Mac Amhlaigh at those political 
constitutionalists who appear to argue in similar terms: namely, that he 
must either concede that there are moral criteria of legitimacy that arise 
outside politics or accept that might could define right, or at least 
whatever works must be legitimate enough.26 
Williams conceded that the BLD is a moral principle but not one 
that is ‘prior to politics’. Rather, ‘it is a claim that is inherent in there 
being such a thing as politics: in particular, because it is inherent in there 
being a first political question.’27 Developing this point, Williams 
reasoned that the first political question is unlikely to be answered in a 
stable way, that acknowledges the disagreements and conflicts that stand 
behind the very need for politics and raise the question in the first place, 
unless rulers can avoid their rule so radically disadvantaging a given 
group that that group could never find it acceptable in the sense of being 
preferable to open war. A situation in which a group of people hold 
power by terrorising another group does not provide an answer to the first 
political question but rather represents the very circumstance that the 
political is supposed to address. Might never implies right in and of itself 
because ‘the power of coercion offered simply as the power of coercion 
cannot justify its own use’.28 In other words, might alone does not supply 
an account of political authority. 
Nevertheless, this last argument might appear to imply that the 
BLD could be satisfied by acceptable ‘outputs’, as Mac Amhlaigh 
proposes, without involving any special sort of political ‘inputs’. 
However, that possibility would suggest that the legitimacy of a given 
regime can result from its promoting a certain moral ideal that lies 
                                           
26 E.g. Charles Larmore, ‘What Is Political Philosophy?’, Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2013): 276–306, 291 
27 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 5 
28 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 5-6 
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outside of politics, in the sense of being beyond reasonable disagreement. 
For example, certain basic human rights and a minimal account of social 
justice might be defended, as Mac Amhlaigh and many other theorists do, 
as moral norms that ought to be accepted and acceptable to all because 
they avoid any group being radically disadvantaged by another. Yet, 
realists maintain that position cannot be plausible if the whole point of 
politics arises from disagreement about which moral ends and modes of 
moral reasoning are to be preferred. Rather, the ‘acceptance’ required of 
citizens must be with the way the political system operates and whether 
its operation is systematically skewed against a given group, so that they 
are consistently disadvantaged from participating, expressing their views 
or influencing decisions. Satisfying these requirements relates to input 
rather than output features of a political system, to the conduct of the 
decision-making process rather than the decisions themselves, though the 
two will be to some degree related. Such generally acceptable input 
features aim at avoiding any group being so radically disadvantaged in 
putting its views that it could be regarded as being dominated by some 
other group or groups within that political society. However, that need 
not mean that no group should ever be disadvantaged by any decision, 
merely that such discriminating decisions should be duly made in a non-
dominating fashion. 
The argument being made here is that the quality of the process 
carries some normative weight of an independent kind from either its 
pragmatic virtues or lack of them, on the one side, or its conduciveness to 
realising some desirable normative outcome, on the other. That weight 
consists in the way those subject to political decisions feel they are 
regarded within the decision-making process itself – the equality of 
concern and respect they are accorded. As I argued in the last section, this 
issue cannot be cashed out in terms of a definitive set of procedural 
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rights, given these too are subject to disagreement. Williams has been 
accused of assuming a prior moral claim that all human beings matter 
equally or that authority requires universal consent,29 notions that might 
ground such a set of pre-political procedural rights. However, like 
political constitutionalists, his argument is purely political – it is a claim 
that derives from the nature of political authority itself towards those who 
are subject to it. How it gets cashed out has varied and been elaborated in 
different ways over time, but the rationale lies within the nature of 
political processes themselves rather than some pre-political morality. 
Nor is it to argue, as Lon Fuller attempted with the idea of the rule of 
law,30 that all that is of normative value could be packed into the idea of 
legitimate procedures so that no bad politician could subvert them nor 
any bad outcome ever be produced by them. Rather, as I also observed, it 
merely shows that the legitimacy of outcomes cannot be separated from 
that of process and that addressing this last has to have priority in our 
constitutional thinking.  
Does doing so favour legislative over judicial supremacy? Yes and 
no. I do not dispute that legal and political constitutionalists can both 
claim their respective processes accord dignity to the individuals who 
employ them. Moreover, both schools believe their respective 
mechanisms to be complimentary in doing so in various respects – that 
both need the other. However, as I remarked in section 1, a key 
component of the ‘circumstances of disagreement’ lies in the inevitable 
partiality of any person’s judgment about him or her self and others. 
Democratic mechanisms seek to address that structural problem in a 
                                           
29 M Sleat, ‘Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist Political Theory’, 
European Journal of Political Theory,  11 (2010) 247-72. For a critique, see E. Hall, 
‘Bernard Williams and the Basic Legitimation Demand: A Defence’, Political 
Studies, 63 (2015) 446-80. 
30 Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: a Reply to Hart,” Harvard Law 
Review, 71 (1957), 630–72, at p. 637. 
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public way by allowing all an equal say in their collective deliberations, 
albeit usually indirectly through their influence over their elected 
representatives. On this account the only way to realise justice in our 
relations with others is through public deliberation about justice in which 
each has an equal say. What touches all must involve all. Of course, how 
far democratic procedures succeed in this endeavour can be questioned 
but the political constitutionalist claim is that not to even attempt to 
develop such a process involves in and of itself an injustice precisely 
because the circumstances of disagreements makes processual and 
outcome issues so intertwined in this regard. It becomes difficult for 
justice to be done in any other way than by trying to show it has been 
done through the equal involvement of those concerned. It is for this 
reason that, as J S Mill noted in his Considerations on Representative 
Government,  
it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one . . . the ordinary 
privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which 
he has the same interest as other people.31 
Legal constitutionalists can and have sought to address this issue 
by noting the ‘democratic’ qualities of their own procedures.32 Indeed, 
judicial review has been frequently characterized as a means for 
rectifying precisely this ‘personal injustice’ in the case of ‘discrete and 
insular minorities’.33 But that is to shift the debate in the direction 
political constitutionalists desired in mounting their challenge. It moves 
the argument away from seeing constitutionalism as a moral framework 
                                           
31 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in Mill, On 
Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 1998), 329 
32 I discuss some prominent examples of such attempts in Richard Bellamy, ‘The 
Democratic Qualities of Courts: a Critical Analysis of Three Arguments’, 
Representation, 49:3 (2013), 333-346. 
33 United States v Carolene Products Co. 304 US 144 at 152 n. 4 (1938), Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust, pp. 75–7, and see PC  110, 249-58 
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for and supplement to democracy, to a view of it as somehow intimately 
connected to how democracy operates, so that even a legal 
constitutionalism requires certain democratic characteristics in its 
processes rather than simply offering an alternative and corrective to the 
supposed inherent shortcomings of such processes – a supposition that 
political constitutionalists have sought to reveal as unwarranted. 
 
‘Now and Around Here’: A Status Quo Bias? 
This brings me neatly to Mac Amhlaigh’s final claim. He argues that so 
long as a prevailing constitutional system, be it legal or political, satisfies 
his minimal theory of legitimacy, then, given disagreements about 
process, a political constitutionalist could defend the continuance of that 
system where it exists but could not argue away from legal 
constitutionalism. The reason for this dismal conclusion arises from the 
supposed self-defeating nature of political constitutionalist arguments. In 
Mac Amhlaigh’s view, political constitutionalists are doomed to cling on 
to the turtle on which they find themselves or risk plunging into the 
abyss.  
 The political constitutionalist does accept that we must look at 
what makes sense ‘now and around here’,34 sharing the view of legal 
constitutionalists that legitimate political rule within modern, pluralist 
societies involves some elements of both constitutionalism and 
democracy that are characteristic of liberalism (and, I would add, 
republicanism). Yet the reasons for this view being shared by most of the 
members of western democracies does not turn on any grand 
metaphysical consensus. It suffices to draw on the recent historical 
experience of various forms of illiberalism and compare them with life 
under more liberal regimes. As a result, constitutional government, be it 
                                           
34 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, p. 8. 
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of a legal or a political kind, is likely to be accepted as broadly legitimate 
where it exists because it offers us a largely stable solution to the first 
political question.  However, its capacity to do so in either way remains 
to a degree historically contingent – the BLD has been met by non liberal 
legal and political systems for most of human history. 
 Does this contingency mean, as Mac Amhlaigh suggests, that 
political constitutionalism can only be defended where it already exists, 
no doubt within the confines of suitably obscure specialist journals? That 
would only be the case if the non-arbitrary defence of either form of 
constitutionalism had to be grounded on some imaginary ultimate Turtle. 
However, unlike his minimal theory of legitimacy, the BLD has no need 
of such question-begging second order foundations. It can be grounded in 
the very idea of a legitimate state capable of answering the first political 
question.35 Where this question receives a satisfactory response, as it does 
‘now and around here’, we can (and should) still ask sensible first order 
political questions about the capacity of different systems to continue to 
be seen as legitimate in the type of societies we live in and the forms of 
disagreement they generate. That possibility rests open to both legal and 
political constitutionalists, with each prompting the other – as in this 
exchange – to improve their case. Yet that exercise can best be achieved 
not through abstract theorising about the moral foundations of 
constitutional values, which by and large political and legal 
constitutionalists share for the historical reasons given above, so much as 
through engagement with the ways legal and political institutions work 
and people’s capacity to employ and relate to them. The contribution of 
political constitutionalism lies in showing the normative necessity and 
worth of such an engagement, noting how it proceeds from the logic of 
                                           
35 Williams, ‘Realism and Moralism’, 8 
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the very arguments legal constitutionalists employ, such as treating 
people with equal concern and respect. 
In this regard, a certain irony arises from Mac Amhlaigh’s 
proffered ‘defence’. A chief motivation behind political constitutionalism 
has been the critique of the conservative status quo bias of legal 
constitutionalism, which by seeking to entrench certain historically given 
constitutional norms risks locking in the privileges and biases of those 
favoured by the prevailing system. Indeed, the desire for hegemonic 
groups to preserve their dominance has been shown to motivate many 
moves from political to more legal forms of constitutionalism.36 Political 
constitutionalism challenges such hegemonic projects, indicating the 
dangers they pose to the legitimacy of the constitutional process in the 
long term. In seeking to foreclose such challenges, Mac Amhlaigh’s 
argument proves intellectually reactionary, the misguided idealisation of 







                                           
36 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy  (Harvard University Press, 2004) 
